Saturday, September 21, 2013

Crystal Cox Case. Retraction Laws SHOULD Apply to ALL blogger, citizen journalists and whistle blowers alike.

An Oregon Federal Judge Claims that Retraction Laws DO NOT Apply to Blogs. Which most ALL Traditional Media Has, whistle blowers use, citizen journalists use. Why in the world would would Retraction Laws NOT Apply To Bloggers?

Oregon Federal Judge, Judge Marco Hernandez Ruled that Oregon Retraction Laws do Not Apply to Blogs. Blogs are a medium of communication, no doubt about it. Blogs SHOULD have protection of Retraction Laws.

Judge Marco Hernandez knew full well that Oregon Retraction Laws do Apply to blogs and this Case Should have Been DISMISSED based on that ONE Reason alone. Yet, Judge Marco Hernandez ruled that blogs are not covered under retraction laws. This ruling affects all online "media" and is not based in law.


An Oregon Legal Article Regarding Retraction Laws and the Crystal Cox Case.

"Oregon’s retraction statutes provide protection from defamation lawsuits if the publisher retracts the allegedly defamatory statement according to the prescribed guidelines. The publisher has two weeks after receiving a demand for retraction to investigate the demand and determine whether to publish a correction or retraction.

The retraction must appear in the first issue published, or first broadcast made, after the expiration of the two-week deadline.

The content of the retraction should substantially state that the defamatory statements previously made are not factually supported, and that the publisher regrets their original publication. Finally, the correction or retraction must be published in substantially as conspicuous manner as was the defamatory statement.

Oregon courts have held that the retraction statute does not violate the Oregon constitution and that it applies only to publishers and broadcasters, and not to individual defendants whose statements happened to be published or broadcast."

Source of Quotes Above and Full Article Regarding Blogs and Oregon Retraction Laws. The article is Regarding Defamation Issues for BLOGS. It is From 2009
http://oregonintellectualproperty.com/2009/10/25/defamation-issues-for-blogs/

Judge Marco Hernandez Ruling Regarding Blogs 

and Retraction Laws


Oregon Retraction Law Below


§ 31.210¹
When general damages allowed

(1)In an action for damages on account of a defamatory statement published or broadcast in a newspaper, magazine, other printed periodical, or by radio, television or motion pictures, the plaintiff shall not recover general damages unless:
(a)A correction or retraction is demanded but not published as provided in ORS 31.215 (Publication of correction or retraction upon demand)or
(b)The plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant actually intended to defame the plaintiff.
(2)Where the plaintiff is entitled to recover general damages, the publication of a correction or retraction may be considered in mitigation of damages. [Formerly 30.160]


Source
http://www.oregonlaws.org/ors/31.210

More on Oregon Retraction Laws / Statutes
http://www.leg.state.or.us/ors/031.html

Oregon Retraction Laws NOT Applied to blogs regarding the Crystal Cox Case, Obsidian Vs. Cox paved the Way for all blogs to not have retraction laws apply and this is simply not based in law and affects all online media, bloggers, citizen journalists, whistle blowers and even traditional journalists.

Retraction Laws SHOULD Apply to Blogs, to online media, as a matter of law.

Oregon State Bar Article Regarding Oregon Retraction Laws and Obsidian Vs. Cox
"• Who is covered by Oregon’s right-of-retraction statute, ORS 31.200-225?

ORS 31.220-225, “Tort Actions, Rules Governing Particular Claims for Relief,” precludes a
plaintiff from obtaining 
general damages for defamation unless the plaintiff has demanded a correction or retraction and the defendant has failed to correct or retract the statement.

In this case, Cox claimed that because the plaintiffs did not seek a correction or retraction, they could not obtain general damages.  Hernandez, however, ruled that “These statutes apply …only to damages on account of a defamatory statement published or broadcast in a newspaper, magazine, other printed periodical, or by radio, television or motion picture. ORS 31.205; 31.210. The Oregon Legislature has not expanded the list of publications or broadcasts to include Internet blogs.”

To Bosworth, the applicability of the retraction statute is one of “two areas of interest in this case,” the other being the First Amendment issue advanced by Volokh and Souede.

“Does the retraction statute apply to this blogger?” he asks rhetorically.

If it applies, says Bosworth, Cox can’t be sued unless the
“plaintiffs have jumped through a number of hoops.”

“The plaintiffs did none of those things here, and that would preclude them from any lawsuit 
for general damages if the retraction statute applied,” Bosworth says.

“Speaking for myself, he continues, “I would have concern about having it apply to everyone. If it’s diluted, then the traditional media might lose its protection. The biggest issue [in the case] is the court’s probable over-breadth re the Internet not being protected by the retraction statute. 

There’s concern on the part of people who are not quite bloggers but are traditional media 
making statements on their websites. I think they’re alarmed. It has not been an issue, in state
trial courts, whether bloggers are protected by the state retraction statute

What the judge said isn’t binding on any other judge, even in the federal system; it just shows the confusion about these things.”

In its amicus curiae brief, the Electronic Frontier Foundation argued not only that the Oregon “…retraction statute should be interpreted to extend to Internet periodicals such as Defendant’s blogs,” but that Hernandez was wrong in ruling, in part, that Cox could not invoke the state’s so-called Media Shield Law, ORS 44.510-540, because it doesn’t cover anyone who is a defendant in a civil defamation suit.

“…The source of Cox’ statements,” the foundation pointed out, “was not at issue.”

“Taken together with the court’s ruling regarding the appropriate intent requirement and the jury’s excessive verdict,” the brief said strongly, “these findings paint an increasingly and unnecessarily hostile landscape for online speech, one that may discourage such speakers or lead them to engage in the type of ‘intolerable self-censorship’ decried by the Supreme Court…”

“While the scope of the First Amendment Protections afforded to Internet journalists is a salient 
and important question,” the brief concluded, “here the primary question was not whether ‘a self-proclaimed investigative blogger’ is considered ‘media’ for the purposes of applying a 
negligence standard in a defamation claim but whether all speakers enjoy the same affirmative First Amendment protections regardless of media status.”

Source and Full Article of Legal Issues and Concerns of Obsidian V. Cox, Moving Forward


"Judge Hernandez Claims the Oregon Retraction Laws do not apply to this Montana 
Blogger, who was Publishing from Boulder Colorado at the time of the post I was on 
Trial For. Here is what Judge Hernandez Said Regarding the Oregon Retraction Statute.

"Oregon Revised Statutes §§ (O.R.S.) 31-200 - 31.225 preclude a plaintiff from obtaining general damages on account of a defamatory statement being published in certain forms unless a correction or retraction is demanded, but not published as provided in O.R.S. 31.215.

Defendant 
contends that because plaintiffs did not seek a correction or retraction, they may not obtained general damages.

These statutes apply, however, only to actions for damages on account of a defamatory
statement published or broadcast in a newspaper, magazine, other printed periodical, or by radio, television, or motion picture. O.R.S. 31.205, 31. 210.

The Oregon Legislature has not expanded 
the list of publications or broadcasts to include Internet blogs."

"Because the statements at issue in this case were posted on an Internet blog, they do not fall under Oregon's retraction statutes."

Source, the Opinion, Decision of Judge Marco Hernandez that Oregon Retraction Statutes do not apply blogs, to the Internet. Even though the Internet is the newspaper in this day and age. And is a periodical and a magazine.

Federal Judge Claims Retraction Laws do Not APPLY to the Internet
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/107229072/Obsidian-V-Cox---Ruling-Hearing

Here is the Oregon Retraction Statute
http://www.leg.state.or.us/ors/031.html


" I.  Oregon's Retraction Statutes

Oregon Revised Statutes §§ (O.R.S.) 31-200 - 31.225 preclude a plaintiff from obtaining
general damages on account of a defamatory statement being published in certain forms 
unless a correction or retraction is demanded, but not published as provided in 
O.R.S. 31.215.  Defendant contends that because plaintiffs did not seek a correction 
or retraction, they may not obtained general damages.

These statutes apply, however, only to actions for damages on account of a defamatory
statement published or broadcast in a newspaper, magazine, other printed periodical, 
or by radio, television, or motion picture.  O.R.S. 31.205, 31. 210.  

The Oregon Legislature has not expanded the list of publications or broadcasts to include 
Internet blogs.  Because the statements at issue in this case were posted on an Internet 
blog, they do not fall under Oregon's retraction statutes. 

Source and Full Legal Opinion Regarding Retraction Laws and Obsidian Vs. Cox


EFF Regarding Oregon Retraction Laws and Obsidian Vs. Cox

"This is a excerpt from EFF, the Electronic Frontier Foundation attorneys in support of a new trial 
for defendant Crystal L. Cox in Obsidian Finance Group v. Cox. Oregon Retraction Laws should 
have applied to defendant Crystal L. Cox.  Kevin Padrick nor Obsidian Finance Group asked 
for a retractions of that blog post, or a reason why to retract.

"  The First Amendment protects all speakers, not just the press, from strict defamation liability. Moreover, protected-though-critical speech cannot be the basis for a verdict reached by a sympathetic 
jury. Especially when read in light of the Court’s (unnecessary and erroneous) additional rulings 
regarding if and how online speakers can earn an elevated “media” or “press” status, these findings 
paint an unnecessarily risky legal landscape for such speakers in the district, one at odds with the 
First Amendment and Oregon law."

"The allegedly defamatory statements attributed to Cox included ones accusing Padrick of all manner of misconduct such as committing “tax fraud,” of being “corrupt,” of paying off media and politicians
of “illegal activities,” “deceit on the government,” “money laundering,” “defamation,” and “harassment,” even going so far as asking whether “Padrick hire[d] a hitman to kill” her. Compl. at ¶ 8.

Plaintiffs alleged in their Complaint that “Defendant knowingly and intentionally published the false and defamatory statements alleged above with actual knowledge of their falsity or with actual malice or 
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement.” Compl. at ¶ 10."

"Under the First Amendment, contrary to the Court’s Order of November 30, 2011, a successful 
defamation action requires at least a showing of negligence, regardless of the “media” status 
of the defendant.

As the jury found Cox liable for defamation pursuant to jury instructions that did not include such a limitation, the verdict must be overturned and a new trial granted.

Moreover, the jury’s award – $2.5 million based on a single blog post, undifferentiated from the myriad other allegedly defamatory posts that the Court eventually found to be protected speech under the First Amendment – was excessive and unsupported by sufficient evidence and thus cannot stand.

Combined with the other overreaching rulings regarding Cox’s media status, these errors will leave 
online speakers in the district unnecessarily and unconstitutionally chilled. Defendant’s motion should 
be granted."

"The Court Failed to Instruct the Jury that It Must Find the Defendant at Least Negligent In Order to Find Her Liable for Defamation.

In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court identified a constitutional floor regarding the intent requirement in defamation claims, holding that “so long as they do not impose 
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.” Gertz at 347. Noting 
that “erroneous statement of fact” is “inevitable in free debate,” and that “punishment of error 
runs the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms 
of speech and press,” the Court gave States Case 3:11-cv-00057-HZ Document 108-1 Filed 01/11/12 
Page 6 of 13 Page ID#:2614 broad latitude to achieve their legitimate objectives of protecting private individuals but drew a firm line barring strict liability statutes because of the inevitable chilling effect: 
“Our decisions recognize that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster 
to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship.” 
Id. at 340.

Fashioned in a pre-Internet context (addressing a defamation claim concerning a traditional magazine publisher), and couched in terms of “media,” “press,” “broadcasters,” and “publishers,” the Gertz Court nonetheless did not limit its ruling to the “media” per se.

Rather, the Court addressed a factual claim before it that involved the (then relatively expensive and limited) ability to “broadcast” a message to a sizable audience, an ability that is now not just 
commonplace but ubiquitous."

"EFF also agrees with the Defendant that the jury’s damages award was unsupported by the evidence, providing a separate basis requiring the Court to grant a new trial.

Trial courts may grant remittitur if a jury award “is so unreasonably high as to ‘exceed any 
rational appraisal,’” is “outrageous, shocking or monstrous,” or “so inordinately large as 
obviously to exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate.” Rosa v. Burlington Northern, 277 Or. 683, 687 (Ore. 1977) (citing Oliver v. Burlington Northern, 271 Or. 214 (Ore. 1975)). Such is the case here.

Plaintiffs assert that the harm inflicted by the Defendant was the result of hundreds of disparaging blog posts made across a multitude of time and across dozens of sites: “Every time someone gets on the Internet and uses a search engine such as Google to research Kevin Padrick or Obsidian Finance, what they immediately find is that Padrick and Obsidian are being accused of 
serious criminal and civil misconduct on literally dozens of websites.” Plaintiffs’

Memorandum In Opposition to Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Judgment filed July 22, 2011,
at p.2 (Dkt. 27). See also id. at p.13 (“Defendant Cox has falsely stated to potentially millions of Internet users that Padrick and Obsidian have engaged in criminal and civil misconduct.”).

However, the Court granted Cox’s motion for summary judgment as to all blog posts (and web sites) save one: a single post from December 25, 2010, that appeared on the www.bankruptcycorruption.com 
web site. See Supplemental Opinion &; Order of August 23, 2011, at 24-31 (Dkt. 31).

While recognizing the highly critical and caustic nature of many of the allegedly defamatory statements, the Court ultimately found that all but one of the posts amounted to, at worst, hyperbolic expression that a reasonable fact-finder could not interpret as provably false assertions (and thus protected speech).

No evidence in the record supports a finding that Plaintiffs suffered $2.5 million in damages due 
exclusively to the single blog post of December 25, 2010. Rather, the evidence appears only to indicate that the reputational harm alleged by Plaintiffs was exclusively or primarily the result of protected speech. That search engines such as Google may highlight and prioritize the Defendant’s protected though 
critical statements in a manner the Plaintiffs may (understandably) find to be unfortunate or unfair is of no legal consequence to a defamation award. Indeed, that the jury appears to have shared the Plaintiffs’ aversion to Cox’s writings similarly cannot excuse an award that is contradicted by the evidence.

See, e.g., Siebrand v. Gossnell, 234 F.2d 81, 94 (9th Cir. 1956) (trial court may “grant a new trial when he is of opinion the verdict is against the weight of evidence …”) (citing Southern Pacific Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926, 932 (9th Cir. 1951), Bradley Mining Co. v. Boice, 194 F.2d 80, 83 (9th Cir. 1951)). The excessiveness of and lack of an evidentiary for the jury’s award warrants a new trial.

"The Court’s Additional Erroneous Findings Regarding the Defendant’s Media Status Amplifies the 
Impact of the Improper Jury Instruction and Threatens to Further Chill Speech.

Amicus is concerned not only with the improper application of First Amendment standards to the Internet speaker in the immediate case but also with the message that the Court’s rulings will send to the broader Internet community.

Combined with the pre-trial rulings filed by the Court on November 30, 2011, they together threaten to 
chill speech in contravention of the First Amendment.

Therefore, in addition to granting Defendant’s motion for a new trial, amicus strongly urge the Court to reconsider two of its previous First Amendment decisions regarding the Defendant’s “media” status.

First, contrary to the Court’s decision, Oregon’s retraction statute should be 
interpreted to extend to Internet periodicals such as Defendant’s blogs.

O.R.S. § 31.215 prohibits the recovery of general damages absent a demand for a retraction (that is subsequently ignored) for “defamatory statement[s] published or broadcast in a newspaper, magazine, other printed periodical, or by radio, television or motion pictures.”

Passed decades before the advent of the public Internet, this statutory list appears to reflect the legislature’s desire to identify and encompass all manner of publication channels, not a desire to pick 
and choose communications made pursuant to certain technologies per se.

Rather, the legislature’s public policy goal was to encourage the publication of retractions of defamatory statements and to therefore reduce litigation and preserve judicial economy by 
reducing lawsuits.

As the Oregon Supreme Court has noted, the retraction statute is “loosely drafted” and that the “legislature probably intended” that the protections be afforded “to those involved in the process of publishing or broadcasting.”

Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 123 (Ore. 1979). That is, “publishers” are afforded the statutory
opportunity for retraction as “[i]t is the ‘publisher’ in that sense who has the power to determine
whether or not a correction or retraction shall be printed or broadcast. Id. As Internet publication is no different in this sense than the broad publication methods identified the statute, it too should be afforded the same opportunities and protections.

Applying the statute to Cox’s Internet posts, as a retraction demand was not issued by the Plaintiffs, the ability to seek general damages should have been precluded.

"Second, the Court’s finding that Cox was not “affiliated with any newspaper, magazine, periodical, book, pamphlet, news service, wire service, news or feature syndicate, broadcast station or network, or cable television system” and “thus, she is not entitled to the protections of the [shield] law in the first instance” was unnecessary to reach and erroneous as a matter of law.

Order of November 30, 2011, at p.3 (Dkt. 95). O.R.S. § 44.520 states that “[n]o person …
engaged in any medium of communication to the public shall be required by a … judicial officer
or body … to disclose … [t]he source of any published or unpublished information obtained by
the person in the course of gathering, receiving or processing information for any medium of
communication to the public.” By gathering information and directing her analysis and commentary to the public  even if it contained factual assertions that were incorrect, and even if some statements were defamatory – Cox was certainly “engaged in [a] medium of communication to the public” and thus afforded the protection. The definition of “medium of communication” was left deliberately broad (and non-exclusive) by the Oregon legislature:

“‘[m]edium of communication’ is broadly defined as including, but not limited to, any newspaper, magazine or other periodical, book, pamphlet, news service, wire service, news or feature syndicate, broadcast station or network, or cable television system.” O.R.S. § 44.510(2).

There can be no question that Internet publication qualifies for protection under the statute, and that individuals engaged in such publication directed at the public should be afforded the statute’s protections.
The Court ultimately should not have ruled on the question, and thus should have refrained from issuing its controversial dicta regarding whether Cox’s status as an Internet publisher precluded her from the shield law’s protection, because the source of Cox’s statements were not at issue.

In her Objection to Plaintiff’s FRCP 37 Motion to Compel, filed November 14, 2011 (Dkt. 66), for example, Cox disclaims a proper reliance on the shield law, identifying and explaining the source of her statements and noting that that source “has nothing to do with the blog post I am on trial for.” Id. at p.3.1 Accordingly, the question of the scope of the shield law’s protection should have been left for another day and for a situation in which a true controversy exists.

Taken together with the Court’s ruling regarding the appropriate intent requirement and the jury’s excessive verdict, these findings paint an increasingly and unnecessarily hostile landscape for online speech, one that may discourage such speakers or lead them to engage in the type of “intolerable self-censorship” decried by the Supreme Court in Gertz.

Not only may they be subject to strict defamation liability and disproportionate damages awards based on search engine placement, independent online publishers may be denied the opportunity to limit their damages (pursuant to the retraction statute) and compelled to produce their sources even though they fall within the letter and spirit of the shield law.

In addition to granting a new trial, amicus urges the Court to reconsider the broader holdings discussed above in order to ensure that speech is not unduly restrained in this new medium.

V. CONCLUSION

While the scope of the First Amendment protections afforded to Internet journalists is a salient and important question, here the primary question was not whether “a self-proclaimed ‘investigative blogger’ is considered ‘media’ for the purposes of applying a negligence standard in a defamation claim” but whether all speakers enjoy the same affirmative First Amendment protections regardless of media status.

Order of November 30, 2011, at p.9. Amicus supports Defendant’s motion for a new trial because the proper defamation standard was not applied below and because the jury verdict was excessive.

Moreover, amicus believes that the question of Defendant’s “media” status unfortunately and improperly emerged to overshadow the merits of the case to the detriment of both the Defendant and of Internet publishers generally.

Accordingly, amicus respectfully asks the Court to grant Defendant’s motion for a new trial and to reconsider its rulings of November 30, 2011, as to the applicability of Oregon’s retraction statute and shield law."

Source of Post
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/110847626/Obsidian-V-Cox---Retraction-Laws-Shield-Laws-Free-Speech-First-Amendment"

Motion For New Trial Filed on Behalf of Blogger Crystal Cox

EFF Files Support Amicus Brief
EFF Regarding Investigative Blogger Crystal L. Cox and the Oregon Retraction Laws

Opening Brief Filed in Obsidian Vs. Cox, Crystal Cox First Amendment Case



More Crystal Cox Case Documents, and Crystal Cox Case Overview

Free Speech Rights "Clicking 'like' on Facebook is free speech, court rules"

"U.S. District Judge Raymond Jackson threw out the lawsuit in early 2012, ruling in part that clicking the "like" button isn't protected free speech.

But in a case that garnered national attention, the deputies and other employees appealed, with Facebook and the ACLU also weighing in on their side. On Wednesday, the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the plaintiffs and reinstituted the case.

"In sum, liking a political candidate's campaign page communicates the user's approval of the candidate and supports the campaign by associating the user with it," the appellate court said in a 62-page ruling. "In this way, it is the Internet equivalent of displaying a political sign in one's front yard, which the Supreme Court has held is substantive speech."

The court added: "Certainly a posting on a campaign's Facebook Page indicating support for the candidate constitutes speech within the meaning of the First Amendment."

The case was sent back to the U.S. District Court for further proceedings, including the possibility of a trial. The Facebook issue was only one of several reasons Jackson threw out the case, and only one of the issues at play in the appeal. Some of Jackson's reasons were upheld by the appeals court. The official ruling was, "we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for trial."

Source and Full Free Speech Rights Case
http://articles.dailypress.com/2013-09-19/news/dp-nws-facebook-ruling-20130919_1_daniel-ray-carter-jr-facebook-page-hampton-sheriff-b-j-roberts

Friday, September 20, 2013

Crystal Cox Case. Free Speech Rights for Anti-Corruption Bloggers; One Blogger, the Laws and the Constitution DOES Not Apply. Crystal Cox is an Anti-Corruption Blogger and CORRUPTION Does NOT Like It.

Hate, Flat out Lies, Attorney Harassment, Human and Civil Rights Violations, Business Life and Reputation RUINED, Threats Constantly all legal, all NOT Defamation and ALL protected by judges, attorneys, and the powers that be.

A Lynch mob of attorneys, judges, bloggers, and more continue to lie about Crystal Cox, lie about her motives in reporting on the Summit 1031 Bankruptcy Case and continue to publish false and defamatory statements about blogger Crystal Cox and they are protected by law, where by Crystal Cox has no rights what so ever within the law,Why?

Because Crystal Cox is not just any blogger. Crystal Cox is a blogger that gets to the top of the search engines for those she is reporting on, and this brings in tips as well as gets top placement in new media.

Crystal Cox researches topics and people deeply, downloads documents, gets court transcripts and motions and digs deep into the case and publishes all that information.

Crystal Cox is an Anti-Corruption blogger and those involved in the business as usual don't like it, so they do everything they can to intimated, harass, sue, bully and ruin the life of this ONE Blogger, who the LAW and CONSTITUTION does not seem to apply to.

The courts seem to only apply the law to who they want to and the courts are run by attorneys, law firms who abuse the process, bully litigants into settling and charge a massive amount of money. This after they sue you, paint you out in media to be the bad guy and guilty and force you to settlements and deals that benefit them.

This is all outside of the Law and Constitutional Rights, however, the legal system is not about the Law, it is about what attorneys want to happen to benefit them. The facts are simply not used in most case.

The Obsidian v. Cox complaint contained no blog post, was for 10 Million Dollars, and extremely vague. And there had not even been a retraction request. Yet the case went to trial after a year of motions, and settlement offers, and the Plaintiff got a 2.5 million judgement and ruined the life of the person reporting on their actions in a VERY high profile Oregon bankruptcy Case.

Crystal Cox fights back and files counter complaints and other complaints, with pages of details, with exhibits and yet is stricken, thrown out, dismissed, and why? Because the courts want a vague and simple statement in your complaint, then they want the attorneys to battle it out over however many years, this is bad for consumers and the public at large and has nothing to do with law. You pay Judges to uphold the law, but what they really do is apply the law to who they see fit, and their opinion of you, your actions is LAW, even if its completely outside of law, facts and constitutional rights.

The attorneys and the law clerks do the work, find the case law and the judges simply throw in their opinion and there is a ruling. Pro Se litigants are discriminated against and the facts of the case are irrelevant. Judges protect attorneys and when there is more then one attorney, it is usually pushed for a settlement. Attorneys such as Marc Randazza use other attorneys, bloggers, legal publications, and other dirty tactics to force a settlement, this usually ends up in a large payment for the attorney. Randazza Legal Group has even been known to take a case Pro Bono then force the litigant to pay.

The system is broken, the laws are irrelevant and the attorneys run the show.

In the case of Tonkon Torp and lawyer David Aman, he plays dirty constantly. He lies about trying to contact a litigant, he files false statements, he uses depositions to violate the constitutional rights of litigants and attempt to set them up for crimes, he lies in declarations, he uses partial settlement offers to public accuse litigants of crimes, he takes private emails and distorts the facts to ruin the life of his target, he has secret meetings with judges and violates the rights of litigants, he bullies litigants and attempt to force them to lie about others and commit crimes to get out of a 10 million dollar lawsuit, all this and more and it's LEGAL because he is an Attorney with an Elite Oregon Law Firm, Tonkon Torp.

Anti-Corruption bloggers SHOULD be protected by the same laws as Traditional Journalists.

It is of vital importance that Anti-Corruption bloggers, whistle blowers, citizen journalists and those reporting the news online in new media are protected in our courts. We have a right to news from these sources if we choose to read it.

There was no Extortion in the Crystal Cox Case, there was simply big attorneys, law firms, politician and government employees in high places that did NOT want to be exposed for what they did. There was no extortion charges filed, no investigation, and there was no motive of extortion, no money given to Crystal Cox to remove content nor was this ever the intention when Crystal Cox was reporting for over 3 years on this Oregon bankruptcy to give voice to the victims of Kevin Padrick, court appointed bankruptcy trustee.

Even if you believe that Crystal Cox is a Criminal, does that mean that she deserves no due process, no criminal investigation, no criminal trial and simply a massive amount of big and small media, legal bloggers, financial bloggers and the public at large to convict her of a crime in the court of public opinion and big media, of which she has no legal platform of defense or due process what so ever?

And even if Crystal Cox had a criminal trial and was found guilty of criminal activity, does this mean that the First Amendment does not apply to the One Blogger exposing corrupt judges, lawyers, cops, ceo's, law firms, politicians and finance companies? If Crystal Cox is a Criminal then cannot she not also be a "Journalist" by law?

Most Anti-Corruption bloggers, whistle blowers, and citizen journalists who expose judges, lawyers, law firms, cops, political issues and other ethical and legal violations are SHUT DOWN immediately, their kids are taken, some are put in mental institutes, many are jailed, ALL are harassed, many lose their jobs and assets, they are sued and they are forced to SETTLE.

I, Investigative Blogger Crystal Cox made a stand, the Best I Could, and Still Do, for all Anti-Corruption bloggers, whistle blowers, and citizen journalists.